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Mental Suffering as an Element of Damages
in Defamation Cases
Jack G. Day*
T o INSURE THE FOCUS of theme it is assumed for present
purposes that the hurdles of proof and proximate cause in
an actionable defamation have been cleared and that there is no
concern with any other issues that may arise, offensively or
defensively, in a defamation action beyond the propriety, or im-
propriety, of proving mental suffering as an element of com-
pensable damage. Stated another way, the crux of the matter is
whether mental anguish is, can, or ought to be classified as
special damage in defamation actions.' Punitive damages are, of
course, an element of no relevance here except in the unlikely
event some court should find that mental anguish provides the
*Of Cleveland, Ohio; Member of the Bar of Ohio.
1 It has been said mental pain and suffering caused by publication is not
special damage, even accompanied by physical hurt also caused by the ut-
terance. Clark v. Morrison, 80 Or. 240, 156 P. 429, 430 (1916); Allsop v.
Allsop, 5 H&H 534, 157 Eng. Rep. 1292, 1293-1294 (1860). But see Baker v.
Winslow, 184 N. C. 1, 113 S. E. 570, 572 (1922) where it was said that when
"the facts and nature of the action so warrant, actual damages include pe-
cuniary loss, physical pain, and mental suffering." Nevertheless this does
not mean the Baker court would have considered mental suffering alone as
special damage in a defamation case. Baker involved language actionable
per se. One may wonder whether the damages presumed when the libel
or slander falls in a per se category does not implicitly include mental
anguish. Is it not always the case that a "bad" word among contemporaries
involves some mental suffering by its object? Cf. Garrison v. Sun Printing
& Publishing Ass'n, 207 N. Y. 1, 100 N. E. 430, 431 (1912):
In the case of such a wrong as that of libel and slander . . . the natural
and immediate effect in the line of results . . . must be on the mind
and not on the body, and therefore such mental disturbance and its
consequences even in the shape of resulting sickness are fairly to be
apprehended.
See also: Curley v. Curtis Publishing Co., 48 F. Supp. 27 (D. Mass.
1942); Hall v. Edwards, 138 Me. 231, 23 A. 2d 889 (1942). Cf. Langworthy v.
Pulitzer Publishing Co., 368 S. W. 2d 385, 390 (Mo. 1963) where it was said,
the right of privacy protects only ordinary sensibilities and not super-
sensitiveness. Inaccurate reporting of non-libelous newsworthy incident
was involved. On its facts Langworthy may very well have reached the
right conclusion. But does its "supersensitiveness" concept echo in the men-
tal suffering area the repudiated "thin skull" doctrine? See Dulieu v.
White & Sons, 2 K. B. 669, 679 (1901). For approval of an instruction that
a susceptibility to fright has the effect of making damage all the greater
see Kenney v. Wong Len, 81 N. H. 427, 128 A. 343 (1925).
1Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1966
MENTAL SUFFERING DAMAGES IN DEFAMATION
special damage under the usual defamation rule requiring some
special damage 2 before punitive damages are allowable.
Physical Impact and Mental Suffering
Except in a distinct minority of jurisdictions, 3 the long-time
rule in negligence law was that no recovery could be had for
2 Cf. Pecyk v. Semoncheck, 61 Ohio L. Abs. 465, 105 N. E. 2d 61 (1952);
Gurtler v. Union Parts Mfg., 1 N. Y. 2d 5, 132 N. E. 2d 889 (1956); Ward v.
Forest Preserve Dist., 13 Ill. App. 2d 257, 141 N. E. 2d 753, 755 (1957). Is
bodily sickness resulting from mental stress brought on by defamation per
se compensable as punitive damage? See Butler v. Hoboken Printing &
Publishing Co., 73 N. J. L. 45, 62 Atl. 272, 275 (1905), where the issue was
discussed but was not necessary to decision and compare Poleski v. Polish
American Publishing Co., 254 Mich. 15, 235 N. W. 841, 843 (1931), where
the trial court intimated in its charge to the jury that "exemplary or puni-
tive damages had to do with 'injury to feelings'."
3 In Hambrook v. Stokes Brothers, 1 K.B. 141 (1925), a landmark of minor-
ity view, a husband, whose wife died from the shock induced by the sight
of a negligently attended motor lorry rushing by her toward a bend in
the street where she had left her children, had a cause of action. The fear
which induced the consequences was not for the wife's safety but for her
children's. Cf. Yates v. South Kirby etc., 2 K.B. 538, 539 (1910). See also
Kenney v. Wong Len, supra note 1, where the plaintiff's shock, accom-
panied by nausea, at finding a dead mouse in food was held compensa-
ble upon proof of negligence and proximate cause. The case report, p. 346,
indicates that plaintiff's distress was immediate upon her finding "the
mouse in her mouth." The Court refused to "discriminate" between these
facts and those involving an external "blow, cut, break, or wrench" on the
ground that it "would be a legal refinement, wholly arbitrary and unjust."
pp. 346-347. See Sahuc v. United States Fidelity & Guarantee Co., 320 F. 2d
18, 20-21 (5th Cir. 1963) (Although the law of Louisiana would allow re-
covery for nervous fright and shock unaccompanied by physical injury
evidenced by objective symptoms and recovery may also be had for mental
suffering arising "from the breach of a contract having as its object the
gratification of some intellectual enjoyments" it will not go so far as to
support a recovery for the owner's psychic trauma upon learning of the
burning of his house nor (dictum) would recovery be allowed if part of
the fire was actually witnessed by the owner. [The opinion discusses a
number of Louisiana negligence cases allowing recovery for fright or nerv-
ous shock without proof of physical injury.] A number of recent cases have
taken the view that mental suffering caused by shock alone is compensable:
Robb v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 210 A. 2d 709, 714-715 (Del. 1965).
("We hold . . . that where negligence proximately caused fright, in one
within the immediate area of physical danger from that negligence, which
in turn produced physical consequences such as would be elements of
damage if a bodily injury had been suffered, the injured party is entitled
to recover under an application of the prevailing principles of law as to
negligence and proximate causation.")
Cf. Georgia Southern & Florida Ry. Co. v. Perry, 326 F. 2d 921, 925-
926 (5th Cir. 1964). (Applying Florida law the court found that the meas-
ure of damages for loss of service in an action for the wrongful death of a
minor child was restricted to the value of the service that a parent is en-
titled to between the time of death and majority of the child but "There
is no such restriction in the measure of damage for mental pain and suf-
fering .. .the amount .. .is left to the discretion of the jury unless clearly
arbitrary or so great as to be shocking to the judicial conscience or indicate
(Continued on next page)
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mental suffering unaccompanied by physical impact.4 The ra-
tionale varied. The injury has been held lacking in that direct
and proximate quality required by proof of causation.5 The
damages are too remote and speculative. 6 The courts would be
inundated with specious claims.7 The injury is lacking substance,
could be simulated more easily than others, was hard to rebut
and standards were not available to gauge the proper compensa-
tion.8 Recovery in such cases was said to be against public
policy.9 And even courts which concede the causal relationship
between the injury and the fear generated by the defendant's
negligence will deny recovery.10
(Continued from preceding page)
that the jury was influenced by prejudice or passion .... The mental con-
dition of a parent resulting from the wrongful death of a child is a proper
matter for consideration in fixing damages for mental pain and suffering.");
Haight v. McEwen, 215 N.Y.S. 2d 839, 845 (S. Ct. 1964) held a cause of
action was stated when parents alleged emotional shock to the mother at
witnessing alleged negligent killing of a child. To pass upon the motion to
dismiss a complete analysis of the evidence at trial was essential;
Hopper v. United States, --- F. Supp. -- (D. Colo. 1965, Civil Action
No. 9084) Vol. 8 ATL News Letter No. 8, p. 249 (Oct. 1965) where a 6 year
olds' complaint for mental and physical injury following from the witness-
ing of the killing of her 4 year old sister by a government vehicle was up-
held against a motion to dismiss as to the merits. (Motion granted with
right to amend for failure to allege that plaintiff was within the ambit of
physical danger.)
4 Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co., 151 N. Y. 107, 45 N. E. 354 (1896)-over-
ruled by Battala v. State, 10 N. Y. 2d 237, 176 N. E. 2d 729 (1961). Braun v.
Craven, 175 Ill. 401, 51 N. E. 657 (1898); Reed v. Ford, 129 Ky. 471, 112
S. W. 600 (1908); Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Robinett, 151 Ky. 778, 152
S. W. 976 (1913); Spade v. Lynn & Boston R.R. Co., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N. E.
88 (1897); Weissman v. Wells, 306 Mo. 82, 276 S. W. 400 (1924); Pettett v.
Thompson, 33 Ga. App. 240, 125 S. E. 779 (1924). Becker v. Borough of
Schuylkill Haven, 200 Pa. Super. 305, 189 A. 2d 764 (1963). (Action for
trespass in wrongful cutting off water supply. Claimed aggravation of
heart condition from hauling water. Testimony as to worry, lack of ability
to eat or sleep. ". . . damages for mental and psychic suffering are not
ordinarily recoverable in absence of physical impact or injury causing such
suffering.") State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co. v. Village of Isle, 265 Minn.
360, 122 N. W. 2d 36, 41 (1963). (Worry and nervousness over husband's
condition would not sustain a verdict for the wife where she had suffered
no physical injuries or disabilities because of accident which injured
husband.)
5 Victorian Railway Comm. v. Coultas, 13 A. C. 222, 226 (1888); Reed v.
Ford, supra n. 4.
6 Reed v. Ford, supra n. 4 at 475.
7 Mitchell v. The Rochester Ry. Co., supra n. 4.
8 Reed v. Ford, supra n. 4; Smith v. Gowdy, supra n. 4; cf. Spade v. Lynn
& Boston R.R. Co., supra n. 4 at 288.
9 Mitchell v. The Rochester Ry. Co., supra n. 4.
10 See Weissman v. Wells, supra n. 4; Spade v. Lynn & Boston R.R. Co.,
supra n. 4 at 288, 290.
Jan., 1966
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One may speculate that the harshness and unfairness of the
rule contributed to the development of a line of cases evading
its effectiveness by the simple device of holding that even mini-
mal physical injury would suffice to allow recovery for the ac-
companying mental suffering. Thus, impacts leaving no external
signs of injury1 ' or surface bruises 12 and the impact from jump-
ing or a slight blow 13 or a jolting ride over tracks and impact
with a seat,14 muscle strain caused by evasive action to avoid
fire'" and the shaking of box car living quarters 6 was held
enough. There is also evidence of considerable judicial willing-
ness to find reasons for compensating mental suffering when con-
sequential upon an action which is willful, wanton, malicious,
humiliating or simply wrongful in connection with an absolute
duty.17 Moreover, intentional torts may occasion the allowance
11 McGee v. Vanover, 148 Ky. 737, 739, 744, 147 S. W. 742 (1912); Berard v.
Boston & Albany R.R. Co., 177 Mass. 179, 180, 58 N. E. 586 (1900).
12 Conley v. United Drug Co., 218 Mass. 238, 240, 105 N. E. 975 (1914);
Kisiel v. Holyoke Street Ry. Co., 240 Mass. 29, 31-32, 34-35, 132 N. E. 622
(1921).
13 Berard v. Boston & Albany R.R. Co., supra n. 11 at 181; Homans v. Bos-
ton Elevated Ry. Co., 180 Mass. 456, 62 N. E. 737 (1902). See Davidson v.
Lee, 139 S. W. 904, 907 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911) Verdict for plaintiff affirmed.
Damages awarded for mental suffering brought on by humiliation and fear,
assault and unlawful restraint, but only technical battery involved.
14 Wood v. New York Central & Hudson River R.R. Co., 83 App. Div. 604,
607, 82 N. Y. Supp. 160 (1903).
15 Steverman v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 205 Mass. 508, 511-513, 91 N. E.
919 (1910).
16 Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Roberts, 207 Ky. 310, 313-316, 269
S. W. 333 (1925).
17 See Nordgren v. Lawrence, 74 Wash. 305, 133 Pac. 436 (1913), where the
pretty nearly maniacal conduct of the landlord in connection with a wrong-
ful forced entry on his tenant's premises frightened an already ill female.
The court said at pp. 437-438: "Whether or not an action will lie for mental
distress alone, when unaccompanied by injury to person or property, need
not here be discussed. Such a question is not present in this case. In this
state mental suffering may be taken into consideration in assessing dam-
ages, where the same is a result of a wrongful act, even though there is no
physical injury." See also Davis v. Tacoma Ry. & Power Co., 33 Wash. 203,
77 Pac. 209, 210-212 (1904). (Recovery approved for mental suffering in
consequence of being mistaken for a scarlet woman, treated in a rude and
insolent manner and told to leave the grounds of an amusement park, but
reversed because the damages reflected the jury's passion and prejudice);
Haile v. New Orleans Ry. & Light Co., 135 La. 229, 65 So. 225, 226 (1914)
(Recovery for humiliation and mortification to fat woman stemming from
conductor's comments on her size); and Larson v. Chase, 47 Minn. 307, 50
N. W. 238, 239-240 (1891) (where it was held appropriate to allow recovery
for mental suffering proximately caused by an invasion of a wife's legal
right to her dead husband's body unmutilated and not dissected). Floyd v.
Stevens-Davenport Funeral Home, 110 Ga. App. 271, 138 S. E. 2d 333, 334-
(Continued on next page)
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of compensation for fright or shock resulting in bodily harm
even though the intentional acts are not directed toward the in-
jured person.'5 And a crude practical joke has been held to
justify compensation when only the consequences from shock
and humiliation were involved.19
Defamation Damage Principles: Analogies to the Law
of Damages in Negligence Cases
No doubt in thrall to the rules of negligence law, the courts
have analogized and attempted to rationalize rulings in terms
which fit the familiar physical impact principles when consider-
ing mental suffering flowing from defamation.
Accordingly, mental anguish has been held compensable
when consequent upon words actionable per se. 20 The presum-
(Continued from preceding page)
335 (1964) (Action for willful, wanton, and gross negligence in disturbing
grave of mother while preparing grave for father not supported by allega-
tions of petition-Demurrer sustained. "It is well settled that recovery for
damages for mental pain and anguish and wounded feelings, unattended by
damage to person or purse, must be predicated upon an intentional tort
or the legal equivalent . . . and cannot be based upon mere negligence").
Tenn. Central R. Co. v. Brasher's Guardian, 29 Ky. L. Rep. 1277, 97 S. W.
349, 350 (1906). (Recovery for mental suffering consequent upon discharge
at the wrong station. The railroad's duty was "absolute .... not excused
for honest errors" and the court approved the submission to the jury of
questions of mental pain and suffering. "Mortification and humiliation are
always . . . elements of damage in such cases," p. 351). Cf. Antelope v.
George, 211 F. Supp. 657, 660 (D. Idaho N. D. 1962) ("Nor is it necessary
... to show a tort against plaintiff's person before she can recover for
mental suffering . . ." Illegal arrest without warrant, delay in being taken
before magistrate without jurisdiction in violation of federal civil rights
act, 42 U. S. C. § 1983. Proper case for punitive or exemplary damage).
And see Olan Mills, Inc. of Texas v. Dodd, 234 Ark. 495, 353 S. W. 2d 22,
24 (1962). (The right of privacy was involved and the court recognized
that there may be recovery for humiliation and mental suffering in the
absence of any physical injury "just as in cases of willful and wanton
wrong.")
18 See Jeppsen v. Jensen, 47 Utah 536, 155 Pac. 429, 430-431 (1916). In-
truder's threat to kill plaintiff's husband "frightened and terrified" plain-
tiff causing her confinement to bed with nervous prostration. "Prima facie,
the acts complained of and testified to constitute an unlawful assault."
19 Nickerson v. Hodges, 146 La. 735, 84 So. 37, 39, 9 A. L. R. 361 (1920). The
practical joke was in front of others and caused the plaintiff, formerly an
inmate of an insane asylum, extreme mental anguish. Plaintiff died while
the case was pending, but the cause of action passed to others by statute
and relief was granted. The court indicated that had plaintiff survived
it would have awarded her substantial damages. And see text at note 38,
infra, respecting a new tort for intentional infliction of mental suffering.
20 McMullen v. Corkum, 143 Me. 47, 54 A. 2d 753, 756-757 (1947) (state-
ments charging larceny); Wilson v. Goit, 17 N. Y. 442, 444 (1858) (lack of
chastity not slander per se and no proof of special damage; recovery for
mental distress denied). Shafer v. Ahalt, 48 Md. 171-173, 30 Am. Rep. 456
(Continued on next page)
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tion of damage supplies the equivalent of actual damage and
enables a parallel to the physical impact cases. Extending the
negligence analogy, the minimal impact cases 21 suggest another
possible rationale for the allowance of damages for mental an-
guish in defamation. Even if the words are not per se actionable
and the emotional element is not considered special damage (as
distinguished from general damage), no particular theoretical
stress is imposed in treating the words as sufficiently damaging
a minimum (following the jostling cases, for example) to support
an allowance for emotional stress.
22
When words are not actionable per se but a cause of action
made out with some showing of temporal or special damage, a
variety of damages have been held permissibly subsidiary in-
(Continued from preceding page)
(1877) (charge of adultery not actionable per se and wife's sickness not a
natural consequence of such words); Beach v. Ranney, 2 Hill 309, 312-314,
(N. Y. 1842) (female spoken of as lacking continence not actionable per
se; wrongful acts of third persons, e.g. children throwing stones and calling
names, is too remote); but see Barnett v. Ward, 36 Ohio St. 107, 110-111, 38
Am. Rep. 561 (1880). (The imputation of lack of chastity is actionable per
se); and Zeliff v. Jennings, 61 Tex. 458, 466-467 (1884) (fornication and
adultery imputations are actionable per se; mental anguish a factor in
damages. Verdict for plaintiff reversed on other grounds); cf. Restatement,
Torts, § 623; See Clark v. Morrison, supra n. 1, Walker v. Tucker, 220 Ky.
363, 295 S. W. 138-139, 53 A. L. R. 547 (1927) (oral words charging bas-
tardy are not actionable per se, humiliation and mental strain are in-
sufficient to supply special damage); Pion v. Caron, 237 Mass. 107, 129
N. E. 369, 370-371 (1921) (charge of theft. This would be actionable per se,
but query whether Massachusetts requires per se defamation for recovery
for mental suffering, see Curley v. Curtis Publishing Co., supra n. 1).
Viss v. Calligan, 91 Wash. 673, 158 Pac. 1012, 1014 (1916) (Non-responsive
answer on trial of lawsuit which answer charged thievery is actionable
per se and not privileged. Damages for such injured feelings and mental
suffering and humiliation as naturally result are proper). See also Kelly v.
Loew's, Inc., 76 F. Supp. 473, 486-489 (D. Mass. 1948). It is not clear that
the finding in Kelly was that a movie version of plaintiff's character was
defamatory per se. Yet a libel was involved and the claim of "ridicule"
was apparently successful. These circumstances meet the requirements of
libel per se-"ridicule" being one of the alternative triad of conditions
("hatred, ridicule or contempt," see Pecyk v. Semoncheck, supra n. 2 at 63)
which will not support slander per se when spoken, but will found libel
per se when written or expressed in other forms more or less permanent.
21 Supra n. 11 through 16.
22 But see Clark v. Morrison, supra n. 1. An even greater hurdle for this
theory resides in those cases which require the loss prerequisite to dam-
ages for mental suffering to be pecuniary. Roberts v. Roberts, 5 B&S 384,
122 Eng. Rep. 874, 876 (1864) (Loss of membership in a religious society
and consortium vicinorum is not sufficiently substantial or material loss);
Beach v. Ranney, supra n. 20 (being in pain and enfeebled in mind and
body and assailed with missiles and epithets is not sufficiently pecuniary);
Williams v. Riddle, 145 Ky. 459, 140 S. W. 661, 664-665 (1911) Loss of the
companionship of a young lady of good family with whom the plaintiff
was keeping company was not a loss of "material temporal advantage."
(Continued on next page)
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cluding compensation for wounded feelings and humiliation. 23
The intentional act cases resulting in some bodily harm also pro-
vide a ready analogy from which theoretical support may be
derived for allowing damages for mental stress in defamation
cases when the latter also involve bodily harm coupled with or
resulting from emotional stress. Although, again, the require-
ment in defamation cases (not involving per se libel or slander)
that there be some pecuniary temporal (i.e. special) damage
precedent to the allowance of damages for emotional stress is a
theoretical impediment.2 4 The same difficulty would impede an
attempt to use the "pure" shock or emotional stress cases (i.e.
no physical or bodily damage) as an analogue in damages for
defamation2 5 although the logic of these cases comes close to
rendering shock and mental suffering "special damage."
(Continued from preceding page)
On the point of pecuniary loss, Clark v. Morrison, supra n. 1 at 430 in-
cludes the following quotation from 25 Cyc. 525:
"The special damage must flow from impaired reputation. It must be a
loss of a pecuniary character, or the loss of some substantial or material
advantage."
23 Cf. Beach v. Ranney, supra n. 20 at 312, 315-316 (although recovery was
denied on the loss shown, the court indicated that the loss of "something
of value" would have satisfied the necessity for special pecuniary loss). See
Poleski v. Polish American Publishing Co., supra n. 2 (special damage to
property, plus damages for injury to feelings. Was the latter punitive?)
See n. 27, infra. In a "per se" situation a prerequisite to the introduction of
specific evidence of special damage may be an allegation of such special
damage, see Butler v. Hoboken Printing & Publishing Co., supra n. 2 at 274.
24 See supra n. 22. A further "third party" limitation has been attacked:
"It is a mistake to assume as is done by Wigmore, Evidence, Rev. Ed.
1940 Vol. I § 209, p. 704 that 'the injury to feelings which the law of
defamation recognizes is not the suffering from the making of the
charge, but is that suffering which is caused by other people's conduct
toward him in consequence of it.' Recovery for such mental suffering
can be had although no loss of reputation is involved" Curley v. Curtis
Publishing Co., supra n. 1 at 28, citing Marble v. Chapin, 132 Mass.
225 (1882) (Chapin did in fact involve publication to a third person,
but only one).
In a very short opinion in Finger v. Pollack, 188 Mass. 208, 74 N. E. 317
(1905), the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts said flatly without in-
dicating the nature of the slander "In an action for slander one of the
elements of damage is mental suffering." The court further said it may be
evidenced by appearance or actions. But see Yavis v. Sullivan, 137 Conn.
253, 76 A. 2d 99, 103-104 (1950) where it was held that the harassment of
the defamed by the defamer was relevant only to the extent that "the
effect of the slanders upon plaintiff's feelings was greater because of the
defendant's great malice." Hurt feelings flowing from conduct not part of
the slanders alleged were not "legitimate elements of damage for the
specific slanders charged."
25 See supra n. 19.
Jan., 1966
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"Pure" Mental Suffering in Defamation Cases
If a parallel can be drawn between the defamation per se
and the intentional wrong cases, there seems to be little theoreti-
cal justification for not allowing recovery for mental suffering
in all defamation actions. For all conceivable slander and libel
would qualify as intentional under a simplistic definition of that
term. The cases have not adopted this position. Accordingly it
is probable that most courts still will require special damage
other than shock or mental or nervous distress as a prerequisite
to recovery for the latter.2 And the requirement that the special
damage must be pecuniary27 makes little sense but it will not be
26 Hoar v. Ward, 47 Vt. 657, 666 (1875) (averment of special damage neces-
sary to actionable slander for words imputing lack of chastity. The special
damage must be pecuniary); Paysse v. Paysse, 84 Wash. 351, 146 Pac. 840,
841 (1915) (charging a person with bastardy is not slander per se and in-
struction to contrary is erroneous; also erroneous to charge on special
damage without averment and proof); Mishkin v. Roreck, 202 Misc. 653,
115 N. Y. S. 2d 269, 270, 274, 277 (Sup. Ct. 1952) ("Crook," without in-
nuendo, is not slanderous per se. Special damages were not pleaded; plain-
tiff proceeded on theory that the utterance was slanderous per se); Fried-
lander v. Rapley, 38 App. D. C. 208, 212-213 (1912) (Words not actionable
in themselves cannot be made so by innuendo. Words not charging on in-
dictable offense are not actionable per se and special damage must be
specially alleged); Hofstadter v. Bienstock, 213 App. Div. 807, 208 N. Y.
Supp. 453, 453-454 (1925) ("Crook" not slanderous per se); Eggleston v.
Whitlock, 242 Ill. App. 379, 381 (1927) ("Crook" who "swindled" another not
slander per se. Special damage necessary if words are to be actionable);
Gaare v. Melbostad, 186 Minn. 96, 242 N. W. 466, 467 (1932) ("Crooked"
spoken of bank officer not actionable per se. No allegation of special dam-
age as a proximate result of statement made); Ringgold v. Land, 212 N. C.
369, 193 S. E. 267, 267-268 (1937) (Demurrer sustained to action for spoken
words "damn son of a bitch" and "damn common and dishonest man" be-
cause complaint lacked allegation of special damage necessary where
slanderous words are only actionable per quod); Martin v. Sutter, 60 Cal.
App. 8, 212 Pac. 60, 62 (1922) ("Bitch" not slander per se); Torres v.
Huner, 150 App. Div. 798, 135 N. Y. S. 332, 333-334 (1912) ("You are drunk"
and "You are a God damn son of a bitch" are not slanderous per se and
not actionable without proof of special damage); Shipe v. Schenk, 158 A.
2d 910, 911 (Mun. App. D. C. 1960) ("Damn liar" and "dead beat" are not
slanderous per se and in the absence of a claim of special damage the com-
plaint must be dismissed); Urban v. Hartford Gas Co., 139 Conn. 301, 93 A.
2d 292, 293, 295-296 (1952) (Implication of "dead beat" or "delinquent
debtor" not actionable per se. Injury to reputation must be alleged and
linked to special damage of material or pecuniary nature and result from
action of third person); Patton v. Jacobs, 118 Ind. App. 358, 78 N. E. 2d
789, 789-790 (1948) (Letters to employer describing plaintiff's failure to
pay debts is not libel per se and does not state a cause of action in the
absence of an allegation of special damages); Hudson v. Pioneer Service
Co., Inc., 218 Or. 561, 346 P. 2d 123, 124-125 (1959) (Printed report listing
plaintiff as delinquent debtor not libel per se and in the absence of either
allegation or proof of special damage a motion for directed verdict properly
sustained).
27 Evans & Harries, 1 H & N 250, 156 Eng. Rep. 1197, 1199 (1856) (Evidence
of loss of trade sufficient to prove special damage).
(Continued on next page)
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defeated even by severe mental distress with accompanying ill-
(Continued from preceding page)
Brooks v. Harrison, 91 N. Y. 83, 89-92 (1883) (Letter charging sale of
impure milk. Slander to same effect. Imputation of crime defamatory per
se if jury under the court's charge found as a fact that poisonous milk
sold or created contrary to statute was a necessary consequence of plain-
tiff's acts. Absent defamation per se evidence of a loss of business was
sufficient to require submission of special damage to jury).
Ross v. Fitch, 58 Tex. 148, 149 (1882) (No indictable offense imputed
by charge of adultery. Not actionable per se but special damage must be
alleged. "Any special damage, however slight, will suffice to sustain the
action." Special damage alleged included loss of boarders at plaintiff's
boarding house and pupils in her school).
Schoen v. Washington Post, 246 F. 2d 670, 671-672 (D. C. Cir. 1957)
(Special damages resulting from inaccurate news story adequately alleged
by allegation of comparative revenues in succeeding years. On trial plain-
tiff would be required to show part of decrease which was natural and
proximate from the inaccuracies in an otherwise accurate story); Afro-
American Pub. Co. Inc. v. Jaffe, 33 LW 2635 (CADC, 1965). (Special dam-
age is not shown by emotional distress and fear stemming from a plaintiff's
having been characterized as bigot in a newspaper publication.)
Morasse v. Brochu, 151 Mass. 567, 25 N. E. 74, 76, 78 (1890) (Excoria-
tion from pulpit of an excommunicated physician joined in a marriage
ecclesiastically scandalous. Imputation that physician's church and marital
status should bar him from medical employment. Requisite averment of
special damage is made with allegations of loss of practice with consequent
loss of income. Further, it was for the jury whether plaintiff was
"touched" in his profession and thus the words spoken of him were de-
famatory per se).
Storey v. Challands, 8 Car. & P. 234, 173 Eng. Rep. 475, 476 (1837)
(Calling a commission agent "a most unprincipled man" under unprivileged
circumstances not compensable without proof of special damage but such
damage may be sufficiently shown if it appears that the person to whom it
was said would not deal with the agent even though the transaction might
have been a losing one had it taken place).
Dixon v. Smith, 5 H & N 450, 157 Eng. Rep. 1257, 1258 (1860) (Imput-
ing the fathering of a child by his maid to a physician will not support an
action for a general loss of business but only such loss as is attributable to
the actual loss flowing from the defendant's words not their repetition by
others).
Hartley v. Herring, 8 Term. Rep. 130, 101 Eng. Rep. 1305, 1306-1307
(1799) (Sufficient pecuniary loss is alleged when the plaintiff states that
"in consequence of the words spoken . . . he was removed from his office,
and lost the emoluments of it").
Wilson v. Cotterman, 65 Md. 190, 3 Atl. 890, 891 (1886) (To say of a
clerk that he caused the ruin of another may be actionable upon the show-
ing of special damage. The loss of a situation would be a natural conse-
quence of such words and constitute the requisite damage).
Lombard v. Lennox, 155 Mass. 70, 28 N. E. 1125, 1125-1126 (1891)
(Plaintiff discharged when defendant advised plaintiff's employer that
plaintiff was defendant's apprentice. Acts done willfully or with gross
carelessness of the rights of plaintiff, damages may be recovered for men-
tal suffering. Court could consider all natural consequences of wrongful
acts even though there was no express reference to them in the declara-
tion).
Matthew v. Crass, Cro. Jac. 323, 79 Eng. Rep. 276, 276-277 (1614)
("Thou art an whore-master etc." are actionable per quod where a loss
of a marriage was caused by the defamation).
Moody v. Baker, 5 Cow. 351, 352, 355-356 (N. Y. 1826) (Loss of marriage
through slander is special damage. Verdict for plaintiff sustained).
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ness. 28 With more justification it has been held the expense in-
curred to rebut the alleged defamation will not supply the special
damage necessary where the words are not actionable per se,
even though the defamed might recover expenses reasonably
expended in mitigation if his cause of action could be independ-
ently established 29 by the showing of a special damage apart
from mitigation expense.
An important characteristic of defamation law, setting it
apart from the rest of the tort area, is the widely followed rule
that special damage must result from the conduct of a third per-
son who is neither the "defamer or the defamed." 30 Obviously a
subjective mental condition cannot survive this test unless a
third person is involved. Nor is it met by the plaintiff's appre-
hensiveness about what third persons might do to alter relations
to his disadvantage. 31 The theoretical implication of defamation
per se satisfies this rule by presuming special damage from the
conduct of a third person but the intentional, wrongful act
theory, applied in defamation, does not meet the standard of the
rule unless the words happen to qualify as per se defamation.
Apparently, libel "qualifies" as "per se" more easily than
slander.3 2
28 Allsop v. Allsop, supra note 1 (Illness arising from excitement induced
by slander is not the sort of damage which is ground for action); Ter-
williger v. Wands, 17 N. Y. 54, 62, 72 Am. Dec. 420 (1858) ("In the present
case the words were defamatory, and the illness and physical prostration
•. . may be assumed .... to have been actually produced by the slander,
but this consequence was not, in a legal view, a natural, ordinary one . . .").
Harrison v. Burger, 212 Ala. 670, 103 So. 842, 843-844 (1925) (Great
mental pain and anguish insufficient allegation of special damage to sus-
tain libel when words used were not libelous per se).
Scott v. Harrison, 215 N. C. 427, 2 S. E. 2d 1, 3 (1939) "Embarrassment,
humiliation and mental suffering" are insufficient for special damage result-
ing from defamation. Recovery denied in absence of words actionable per
se. The rationale against allowing recovery for physical damage allegedly
consequent upon defamation is that the damage is too remote since it is
dependent on mental damage and extends the causation one step further.
See Butler v. Hoboken Printing & Publishing Co., supra note 2 at 274-275.
29 Bigelow v. Brumley, 138 Ohio St. 574, 37 N. E. 2d 584, 594 (1941) (But
"... he may not pull himself up by his own bootstraps, and by such ex-
penditures create a cause of action for himself where one did not otherwise
exist").
30 Bigelow v. Brumley, ibid, 3 Restatement, Torts 185, § 575, comment b.
But see the quote from the Curley case in note 24, supra n. 1.
31 Bigelow v. Brumley, supra n. 29 at 594.
32 See Pecyk v. Semoncheck, supra n. 2 at 63, where the court, apparently
willing to characterize the defamatory words in question as "the grossest
and most scandalous," nevertheless would not find them slanderous per se
although the words "if written" would have been actionable per se as tend-
(Continued on next page)
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A persuasive reason for the per se rule is, of course, that
defamation is an action for damage to reputation3 3 which the
rule establishes by presumption. Evidence of actual damage to
reputation may prove what is presumed in the per se situations,
but the "pecuniary" requirement for actual damage makes no
sense. However, unless the action is to be transformed into one
for extreme outrage, invasion of privacy, or intentionally or wan-
tonly caused distress, 34 there is no occasion in logic to allow dam-
ages in defamation cases for the consequence of shock, mental
suffering or anguish or derived physical harm even where special
damage apart from mental suffering is presumed or proven. The
presence of malice ought not to alter this conclusion.
3
This gives rise to the question whether under any cir-
cumstances defamation ought to found compensation for any
consequence other than damage to reputation. A not entirely
convincing answer is found in some of the cases couched in the
verbiage of the law of proximate cause.36 Recovery extends to
damages reasonably foreseeable as the normal consequences of
(Continued from preceding page)
ing "to subject a person to public hatred, ridicule or contempt." Cf. Ward
v. League for Justice, 93 N. E. 2d 723, 726 (Ohio App. 1950) appeal dismissed
154 Ohio St. 367, 95 N. E. 2d 769 (1950); Burrell v. Moran, 82 N. E. 2d 334,
336 (Ohio C. P. 1948).
33 "A more careful examination ... discloses that the real and full theory
on which a recovery was refused was that an action for slander or libel is
brought to recover fundamentally for injury to character, and that the
special damages necessary to sustain such an action must flow from dis-
paraging and injuring it; that illness 'was not, in a legal view, a natural,
ordinary one (consequence), as it does not prove that the plaintiff's charac-
ter was injured. The slander may not have been credited by or had the
slightest influence upon anyone unfavorable to the plaintiff'." Garrison v.
Sun Printing & Publishing Association, supra n. 1. (Discussing Terwilliger
v. Wands, supra n. 28 at 57, holding no recovery for mental distress and
physical pain consequent upon defamatory words unless the words were
actionable per se).
34 Cf. Restatement, Torts 2d § 46 (ALI, 1965); IV Restatement, Torts § 867
(ALI, 1939); see Brink v. Griffith, 396 P. 2d 793, 796-797 (Wash. 1964).
35 But see Baer v. Rosenblatt, 203 A. 2d 773, 781 (S. Ct. of N. H. 1964) (Evi-
dence of special damage of a pecuniary nature but the court said ". . . there
was evidence from which the jury could find actual malice . . . and could
award damages for mental distress and vexation . . ." The court also said
that upon a finding of malice a more liberal rule of damages prevails and
the jury "is to 'endeavor, according to their best judgment, to award such
damages by way of compensation or indemnity as the plaintiff on the whole
ought to receive and the defendant ought to pay'"); Hall v. Edwards,
supra n. 1 at 890 (actual malice may be shown to enhance damages).
36 Lynch v. Knight, IX HLC 576, 11 Eng. Rep. 854, 855 (1861) (Slander of
wife resulted in husband's sending her back to her father. Recovery for
loss of husband's consortium denied); Georgia v. Kepford, 45 Iowa 48, 49-
50 (1876) (action for divorce on ground of inhuman treatment is not the
(Continued on next page)
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the defamation. But apparently one may recover for mental
anguish under such logic only if his character is defamed per se
or the defamation results in special pecuniary or material dam-
age. It is difficult to see why proximate cause invests mental
anguish with compensable status in conjunction with presumed
or proven special pecuniary damage 37 but not without it. Per-
haps an effort at logical symmetry explains the view that:
"... . 'the injury to feelings which the law of defamation recog-
nizes is not the suffering from the making of the charge, but
is that suffering which is caused by other people's conduct
towards him in consequence of it'." Curley v. Curtis Pub.
Co. supra, at p. 28.
Recovery under this view can be had even though no loss of
reputation is involved. And there is a new tort attaining more
and more recognition. Apparently unwilling to blink those situ-
ations in which deliberate, willful and malicious words, directly
or inferentially, support an intentional infliction of mental suffer-
ing, courts have allowed recoveries.38
(Continued from preceding page)
proximate consequence of a defamation charging larcency or adultery);
Field v. Colson, 93 Ky. 347, 20 S. W. 264, 265 (1892) (Defeat in election
for public office charged to statement that plaintiff had abandoned a
previous political race in return for money. Damage too remote); Vicars v.
Wilcocks, 8 East 3, 103 Eng. Rep. 244 (1806) (Dismissal from position by
employer not proximate consequence of defendant's telling employer plain-
tiff had unlawfully cut cordage of defendant); German Savings Bank v.
Fritz, 135 Iowa 44, 109 N. W. 1008, 1009 (1906) (Failure to connect state-
ments respecting a bank's unsound condition with a subsequent run on the
bank. Judgment for defendant affirmed); Briggs v. Brown, 55 Fla. 417, 46
So. 325, 331 (1908) (Demurrer properly overruled in action for defamation
when letter to bonding company charges delinquencies by plaintiff in his
working office and special damage allegations show inability to secure any
employment requiring surety bond); Williams v. Riddle, 145 Ky. 459, 36
LRA (NS) 974, Ann. Cas. 1913 B 1151, 140 S. W. 661, 665 (1911) (Loss of
companionship not the natural and probable consequence of the words
describing racial antecedents); See Garrison v. Sun Printing and Publish-
ing Ass'n, supra n. 1 at 431-432, where it is said that:
"... in an action brought . . . for a wrong intentionally, willfully and
maliciously committed, the wrongdoer will be . . . responsible for the
injuries which he has directly caused, even though they lie beyond
the limit of natural and apprehended results . . ."
37 The rule that pecuniary special damage is necessary (absent words per
se defamatory) has not always been strictly followed. An injury to reputa-
tion may be enough without more to base a claim for mental suffering, cf.
Brink v. Griffith, supra n. 34 at 796-797, where the court said damage for
wounded feelings could be recovered on either a theory of defamation or
invasion of privacy although only general damage was proven. The de-
cision did not discuss the imputation of criminality as defamation per se;
Curley v. Curtis Pub. Co., supra n. 1 at 28.
38 Mitran v. Williamson, 197 N. Y. S. 2d 689 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1960). There is
an accelerating willingness to protect against tortiously induced emotional
(Continued on next page)
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Summary and Conclusion
Paralleling negligence developments in the physical contact
cases, mental suffering as an element in damages in defamation
cases may be compensable when defamation per se is involved.
Apart from the objective in defamation cases, i.e. reparations for
impaired reputation, there seems no logical reason why an ele-
ment for mental suffering should not be considered where the
action is per se-or the proof of at least some per quod defama-
tion damage 39 is accompanied by consequential mental suffering.
Such a result has a theoretical kinship with the negligence cases
conditioning damage for mental suffering upon minimum con-
tact.
A number of arguments have been advanced against allow-
ing compensation for shock, mental anguish, and mental suffer-
ing and comparable categories of damage in the negligence area
unless accompanied by physical damage. Public policy (e.g., a
concern for sham claims), difficulty of proof, the lack of direct-
ness necessary to meet standards of proximate cause, remoteness
and speculative character of the damage, difficulty of defending,
and the problem in fashioning a ready gauge for the quantum of
damage40 are included among the reasons for denying recovery.
The same infirmities could be charged to mental damage or an-
guish flowing from defamation.
However, the rebuttal to most of the charges laid against
allowing the mental element applies with approximate force, at
(Continued from preceding page)
disturbances. No case has been found forthrightly granting legal protection
to peace of mind but a number of decisions have fastened recoveries for
mental distress and outrage upon traditional torts. Some of the latter have
involved defamation. Others have not and are outside the scope of this
paper. Cf. Nickerson v. Hodges, supra n. 19, Restatement, Torts 2d § 46
(ALI, 1965). Lyons v. Zale Jewelry Co., 246 Miss. 139, 150 So. 2d 154, 158
(1963) ("In general, damages for mental anguish or suffering are recover-
able when they are the natural or proximate result of an act committed
maliciously, intentionally, or with such gross carelessness or recklessness
as to show an utter indifference to the consequences when they must have
been in the actor's mind." Shock and hysteria with physical and emotional
consequences after zealous bill collector shouted insults over telephone
after mother disclaimed knowledge of debtor son's whereabouts); Digsby v.
Carroll Baking Co., 76 Ga. App. 656, 47 S. E. 2d 203, 205, 207-208 (1948)
(Recovery proper for mental anguish suffered as result of profane, abusive,
and suggestive language by defendant's servant attempting to collect a
debt from pregnant plaintiff's husband).
39 In any event there is considerable authority for the proposition that the
special damage necessary as a pre-condition to allowances for mental suf-
fering must be pecuniary in nature. See supra n. 22.
40 See supra n. 5 through 10.
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least, in both the negligence and defamation areas. Without
attempting an elaborate refutation, there is no reason to assume
that a jury is not as capable of assessing the existence, proxi-
mate cause and amount of damage in a mental anguish or mental
suffering case as it is in other situations involving non-objective 4 1
damage such as subjective pain and suffering. Both categories
can be submitted under proper instructions and it is as probable
in a mental suffering case as any other (perhaps more so) that
the jury will reject fancy, speculation and far fetched causa-
tion concatenations. In addition, there is the fact that medical
science has advanced enough that more is known about damages
that are mental or otherwise subjective than may be generally
realized. But assuming that mental conditions do pose greater
problems of analysis, assessment and prognosis, they do not be-
come less so when coupled with a physical injury, even a slight
one, 42 or a defamation severe enough to be classified as "per se"
or one with supporting proof "per quod." The medical problem
is identical. One suspects an element of sub-silentio corrobora-
tion in the mere presence of physical injury and the presumably
aggravated nature of the hurt in per se cases. But what of the
minimal impact decisions?
A more persuasive case can be made for disallowance of
compensation for mental damage in defamation cases because the
prime objective in defamation actions is compensation for injury
to reputation-a goal which does not encompass mental suffering.
One solution to the dilemma posed by a demand for recovery for
mental suffering in such cases (although short on logic) lies with
the rule that the tort feasor is charged with the foreseeable
consequences of his actions among which are the effect upon
mind and emotions of the defamed even though reputation is
actually affected only through the intervention of a third party
who is neither defamer nor defamed.
A developing tort, so far nameless, would allow recovery
for mental suffering inflicted intentionally by the spoken word.
41 No precise definition of objective damage is implied by this reference.
No more is intended than such damage as depends upon the victim's testi-
mony, supplemented or not by the testimony of an expert medical witness,
regarding subjective complaints.
42 "My experience gives me no reason to suppose that a jury would really
have more difficulty in weighing the medical evidence as to the effects of
nervous shock through fright, than in weighing the like evidence as to the
effects of nervous shock through a railway collision or a carriage accident,
where, as often happens, no palpable injury, or very slight palpable injury,
has been occasioned at the time." Dulieu v. White & Sons, supra n. 1 at 681.
14https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol15/iss1/5
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Under this theory a foreseeable consequence (mental anguish)
proximately caused by spoken words will posit liability without
regard to effect on reputation.43 With this development a de-
famed person may reach his tormenter with an adequate remedy
(and may couple it with a conjunctive or alternative action in
defamation 44) where existing rules of defamation will not allow
compensation for verbally induced ravages of the mind.
43 See supra n. 38.
44 For an example of a pleading coupling the right of privacy with defama-
tion, see Brink v. Griffith, supra n. 34.
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